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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
Dr. Allen Panzer, ) CV13-{D70805-DDP-J'CG 
Amy Sayers, ) 
Lily Jeung and ) Plaintiffs' Opposition to 
Darren Walchesky, on behalf of ) Special Motion to Strike 
themselves and all others similarly) Complaint demanding wages 
situated, ) pursuant to Fair Labor Standards 
) Act, and contract based cause of 
Plaintiffs, ) action Quanfum Mm"Uit, Requestfor 
} plailntiffs' attorney fees 
) 
V§. ) Febuary 10, 2014 
) 10:00 asn. 
Yelp, Inc. ) Courtroom 3, 2 nd Floor 
) Hon. Judge Dean D. Pl'egel'son 
Defendant. ) 
25 COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
26 TO STRIKE CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION QUANTUM MERUIT based 
27 on their intentional misreading of the anti SLAPP statute. Request for 
28 attorney fees. This lawsuit has nothing to do with "Speech" but is routine FLSA 
29 action to get these plaintiffs their wages~ 
31 Daniel A. Bernath, Esq. .January 10,2014 
32 
PlAiNTIFIrS @II"POSITION TO g':RiVOlOI..!5 SPEelAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION ,0 ANTH-SLAP~ MOTION) 
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• 
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33 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
34 Once again, Yelp is tI-visting settled law in the hopes that nobody win 
35 notice. 1 Yelp is again sued in a run-of-the mill FLSA action with a pendent 
36 state court equity cause of action for contract/quantum meruit. Yelp wsts 
37 this to say that 1. Yelp is on the internet, 
38 2. Plaintiffs have posted their labolrs For Yelp on the internet, 
39 2. Therefore, Yelp hag immunity frm"l'1 an FLSA lawsuit. 
40 Under Yelp's continual "wsted" legal reasoning fiu, a Yelp CEO could 
41 spill his yogurt in the lobby and Yelp would be immune from a personal 
42 injury lawsuit if the victim also posted 011 Yelp. If Yelp stops paying its San 
43 Francisco landlord, Yelp believes that an anti SLAPP motion should get that 
44 contract caUse of action dismissed. Yelp has just hit on this "twisty" 
45 strategy however, Earlier, when Yelp laborers in the sales department were 
46 not paid overtime and sued Yelp, Yelp didn't have the audacity to bring an 
47 anti SLAPP motion. Larkin v. Yelp (attached) Yelp was sued by laborers 
48 who they named "account executive trainee, junior a.c;, account executive 
49 and senior account executive, 
IOn April 26, 2013, after hearing sworn testimony from a Yelp! s executive, 
Trial Judge Peter S. Doft in San Diego California declared that Yelp! wsts 
the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal principles .... I'm just 
stunned actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is wsted around by 
[Yelp! J. Everything is twisted around." 
PIoAiNTIHS OIr"POSITI<l:JN 1'0 FRIVOLOUS ~PE(;IAL MOTION iO STRIKE 
(Oppo:sunoN' Til ANl'i-1U,A!F"P MOitION) 
50 This is the same thing Yelp has done with its writers-calling 
51 some "Community Managers", "eluployees", G£Scouts", "Elites", 
52 etc. but all doing the exact same labors for Yelp with some people 
53 paid wages and plaintiffs herein, not being paid wages. Plaintiffs herein 
54 provided reviews to attract an audience for defendant Yelp, said audience 
55 used as the basis for the salesman to make sales contracts with advertisers. 
56 Yelp's defenses to the Larkin FL.SA action was not a frivolous anti SLAPP 
57 motion but 'Gplamtiffs, have signed Teleases that prevent them 
58 from bringing" an FSLA lawsuit. Larkin. Settlement Motion, page 3, 
59 Lines 7-9 Attached) Yelp finally paid $1,250,000 to the unpaid salesmen as 
60 part of the settlement in that FLSA action. 
61 Yelp trots out the same frivolous defenses that laborers "agreed" to work 
62 for free and can't sue Yelp under the provisions of The Fair Labor 
63 Standards Act. Larkin Settlement Motion. Rather than repeat the P and 
64 A's that hold Yelp's defense is frivolous, Plaintiffs invite the Court to look 
65 the Opposition to Strike where the law is clear that a laborer cannot waive 
66 his or her rights under the FSLA. The TOS that Yelp produces, especially 
67 the so called Elite TOS were drafted by Yelp well after the employment 
68 relationship began (Indeed, the Elite TOS was drafted by defendant 
69 specifically to have this judge read it in this motion). 
IPLAINTIFfS @PP!!)SITION TO FRIVOLOIJS SPECIAL MonON YO STRIKE 
(@pposm@N YO AN'Il'n-~l\.APIP MOTION) 
, 
70 PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED 'liHEIR CON'UENT WIYH A REASONABLE 
71 
72 Yelp paid Community Managers, Scouts and paid for well over 200,000 
73 reviews; Yelp admits an these laborers were paid in wages. Plaintiffs have 
74 repeatedly pled that they were paid, as were the Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
75 plaintiffs, but as yet, not in FLSA required wages and not wages as Yelp has 
76 paid its hundreds of thousands of other writers [So many reviewers were 
77 paid that Yelp admits to the SEC and FTC that it is beyond t.'heir ability to 
78 . count. SEC filing by Yelp]. Complaint 6,9,10,11, 12, Defendant again 
79 deceives this Court by falsely stating that at Compo 15-18 "used Yelp for 
80 socialnetvl'orking." Plaintiffs say no such thing. Yelp is saying that because 
81 plaintiffs liked their job as vvriters that they should not be paid. Again, 
82 and of course, Yelp again gives no authority for such a proposition. 
83 This motion is 100% frivolous and and/or for the purpose of delay and 
84 plaintiffs should be reimbursed for their attorney tees to oppose it and to 
85 send Yelp the judicial equivalent of an email-such nonsense will not be 
86 tolerated in our Courts. 
87 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has emphatieally stated that contract type 
88 causes of action cannot be reached by the anti SLAPP motion and there is 
89 no immunity for contract causes of action under the CDA. Barnes V. 
PLAiNTiffS OPPOSITION TO fRIVOI.OlJS $PtECIA!. MOTION YO STRIKE 
{OPPOSITION ,0 ANTI-SU\PP MOTION) 
• 
90 Yahoo, i'(l,fra. Yelp has repeatedly been given this 9th Cir. Case in Bernath v. 
91 Yelp in Oregon Circuit Court and in a letter to meet and confer requesting 
92 that Yelp withdraw their frivolous Special Motion to Strike. (attached) 
93 
95 TYPE CAUSES CF ACTBCN 
96 AND !l\l!@Y DEFAMATION 
97 AS StllCif~w l'H~ A~"i!'i-$rtA.fP'P STA'fU'fES 
98 ~~ N@'!i A~ti!'L Y 
99 Defendant's motion is a disgrace, submitted by a new admittee to the 
100 California Bar, Shanti Michaels #277552 and a boiler plate motion that 
101 the so called CALIFORNIAAI\ITI SLAPP PROJECT has used again and 
102 again and again to burden the Courts and plaintiffs. Yelp demands this 
103 Comt stretch this law; like a lower lip pulled over the Court's head. Yelp 
104 opinies that as PLAINTIFFS spoke on a public forum that the FLSA 
105 complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the anti SLAPP statute. Yelp 
106 says that not paying wages is "conduct in furtherance of the 
107 exercise oftheuoconstitutionall'ight offree speech." sic Motion 
108 p.ll, LlO-12. That is gibberish and this Court should not turn a 
109 routine FSLA action into a mislabeled crusade to save "Free Speech." 
PLAINTiffS OPPOSITION YO FRIVOlOUS SPECIAL MOTION YO STRiKE 
(Cpi>OSmON 'rot'll ANTI-SILArPl? M(lIY!@N) 
• 
il" 
fliI' 
'-V' 
110 'To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under 
111 a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or 
112 she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for 
113 services from the defendant and that the services rendered were 
114 intended to and did benefit the. defendant.~ (Ochs v. PacifiCare of 
115 California (2004) i 15 Cal.AppAth 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal 
116 citation omitted.) 
117 Plaintiffs have clearly pled the elements of quantum merit. There was an 
118 express request for services from the defendant. Complaint para. 16, line 
119 25, and on PA, line 1; para. 17, Line 17-18; para. 18, Lines 4-5. The 
120 services were requested and "did benefit the defendant." Cmpt para. 76. 
121 Yelp demands that plaintiff use its tools, wvrN.yelp.cmll, server and 
122 computer program, wear its logo on clothes, WTist bands, hand out Yelp 
123 stickers, represent that they were employees of Yelp, Inc., follow its many 
124 rules or suffer "serious penalties" Complaint Para.52 1-25 and to wear Yelp 
125 gear to identify them as Yelp employees and/or laborers, entitling plaintiffs 
126 to wages, over and above the trinkets, bling and Yelp "undies". 
PiAINTllFfS OPPOSIYI€H1/! TO fR!VOWU5i SPECIAl. MonON TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSiTION TO ANTI-SLAI?P MOTION) 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
Yelp admissions on its website w"vw.vclij.com Yelp!'s logo is proudly 
called a "YelpZR4.SM". Demanding more labor, YelpJ instructs its 
writers, "Sounds like vou need to get to writing some reviews 
there cowboy." (see decl of Bernath) 
!!y for our Elite Events. 
I Velp SSlM FrancisIW Shirt 255prfnterJ 
a. 
t Where do you Yelp? You Yelp San Francisco, don1 yoU? C'mon.· Sure 
you do. SF is where we &1arted and 
cOlltint.'e to go strong. This shirl was 
pri~!ed in a limned run for Ol1l' frl:it big 
nol:day party. Oh my gD$i1, you 
w"r"n~ there? ~ WB!' only like tria 
cooles! freaking party 011 the planet. 
You're so lame. 
Star Shirt··· ..... :: 
You remember thIS 0;111117 Dude till:' 
.:,h!7 I·; lI!(i ';.(' r(H'li Thl"- w:,s Ihe h: .. t 
I 
I 
PILAINT!fFS @Pi"~SiT!ON TO FRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRII(E 
(OPPOSITION TO A.NTI-SLAPP MOTRON) • 
133 Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings 
134 and wear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting 
135 with free liquor" ... for our first big holid&y party. Oh my gosh, you 
136 weren't there? It was like the coolest freaking party on the planet. 
137 You're so lame." 
PLAINTifFS OI"PClSITi@N YO FRiVOLOU~ $PECIA!. MOTiON TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-$i.AIP'P MOTDON) 
139 
140 
PlfliN1ri~1F5 «.Jiil"if'OSln@~~ 1@ IFmvowu!O SPtEC;:!AL MOTION 10 STI!UKE 
{@P?OS!T!(lN: "'I'@ JiiJ.g'!"I-$~l\i?~ iV~@'iO!<C!} 
141 "**Please note that Yelp! in the urI 
142 line calls them "m~me§" but in the picture calls them "hot shorts" 
143 
PLAINTifFS IrM"p~$ln~N TO iTmvouHBS $1"~CIAt MOTION 'i'@ SYIl<IKE 
(@pposm@N 1'0 ANii!·$II..1tflillP MOYION) 
144 'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever 
145 the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in 
146 a sum certain, or for the reasonable value of services, goods, etc., 
147 furnished. It makes no difference in such a case that the proof shows 
148 the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied in 
149 fact. or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be 
150 based upon money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void 
151 contract, or a pertormance by one party of an express contract." (Utility 
152 Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) i 12 Ca/'AppAth 950, 958 [5 
153 Cal. Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.) 
154 Yelp! attempts to bring an }J'ifTI SLAPP motion as a sort of summaty 
155 judgment motion with no evidence by the moving party. But it cannot meet 
156 the preliminatyrequirements of the statute. Yelpl can't obtain a motion to 
157 strike on an alleged ANTI STR.A.TEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC 
158 PARTICIPATION because Yelp! is being brought to the bar of justice for 
159 breach of contract and quasi-contract causes of action Quantum Meruit and 
160 Unjust Enrichment. 
161 On May 7, 2009 - The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
162 court's order dismissing the case. The appellate court determined that 
PLAINTlI<FS OIi'POSITEON TO fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRU(E 
(OlO'I"OSmON TO ANTi-nAp-if! MOTIOfil> 
163 plaintiff's case could proceed to trial because plaintiffs allegations might .~ .. 
164 support a claim for contract-like promissory estoppel and held that the 
165 Communications Decency Act § 230 would not preempt the contract 
166 related claims Barnes v. Yahoo! mo F. ad 1096 
167 httllilftinyurl.comflo4izr6 case text 
168 insoja1' as Barnes alleges a breach of conu'act claim under 
169 the theory ~fpromissory estoppel, subseC1:i.on 230(C)(1) a/the 
170 Act does not preclude her cause of action. (Ol!, at 5335) 
171 As we indicated above, Barnes' complaint could also be read to base 
172 liability on section 90 of the Restatclnent (Second) of Contracts, 
173 which describes a theory ofl'ecovery often known as promissory 
174 estoppel. .... 
175 Such, then, is the promise that promissory estoppel requires: one that the 
176 pro:missor intends~ actually or constructively, to induce reliance 
177 on the part of the promisee. From such. intention courts infer the 
178 intention that the promise be legally enforceable. Thus, when A 
179 sues B for breach of contract, A is alleging that B violated an obligation that 
180 B intended to be legally enforceable. In promissory estoppel cases, courts 
P!.AINTlI'I'S OPII'IOSITION TO !FRIVOLOU5 $P!!CIAl MOTION TO STRIKE 
(@PPOSITION 1"@ AN'fI-SI!.AP!l» MOYION) 
Q 
181 simply infer that intention not from consideration but from a promise that 
182 B could have foreseen would induce A's reliance. 
183 B Against this background, we inquire whether Barnes' 
184 theory of recovery under [quasi contract] promissory 
185 estoppel would treat Yahoo as a "publishe .. ' 01' speaker" 
186 under the Act. 
187 As we explained above, subsection 230(c)(1) precludes liability when 
188 the duly the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the 
189 defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. In a 
190 promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the 
191 duty the defendant allegedly -viola.ted springs from Q. 
192 ~ontract- an enforceable promise--not from any non~ 
193 contractual conduct 01' capacity of the defendant, See GTE 
194 C01p., 34'7 F.3d at 662 ("Maybe [the] plaintiffs would have a 
195 better ru'g!..uu.cnt that, by its coniT'ucts .," [the defendant] 
196 assumed a duty to protect them. "), Barnes does not seek to 
197 hold Yah.oo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party 
198 content. but rather as the counter~p-arty to a contract. as a 
199 promisor Who has breached. 
~!.AINT!rr"'S OPPOSITION TO FllUVO!.OIJS $PriCIAL MOTION "W STRIKE 
(OPPOSiTION! YO ANTi-SlAPP MOYION) 
~ .. 
200 
201 Promising is different {from publishing type actions} 
202 because it is not synOl'lyrrwlls with the performance of the 
203 action promised. That is, whereas one cannot undertake to do 
204 something without simultaneously doing it, one can, and often 
205 does, promise to do something without actually doing it at 
206 the same tiane. Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo's 
207 publishing conduct. but from Yahoo's manifest intention to be legally 
208 obligated to do something, ..•. Contract law treats the outvval'dly 
209 manifested intention to create an expectation on the part of another 
210 as a legally significant event. That event generates a legal duty distinct 
211 from the conduct at hand, be it the conduct of a publisher, of a doctor, 
212 or of an overzealous uncle.lMl 
213 footnote '4 All the same, we believe the distinction we draw is sound. 
214 Though promissory estoppcllurks on the sometimes blurry boundary 
215 between contract and tort, It§ promissory character 
216 distinguishes it from tort. That character drives our 
217 ~nalysis here andplace:12Jll"omissory estoppel beuond the 
218 
219 
reach of subsection 2;w(c)C1). 
PI.AINilFFS @PPE)SITION TO (fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO SYRII{E 
(@plI'lOsmot" iO ANra-f!i!.APIP MonON) 
220 
221 Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a breach 
222 of contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel. 
223 subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does not preclude her cause 
224 of action. {EmphasJ.s added} 
225 The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes 
226 A cause of action for UI\just enrichment 
227 Earlier, we recognized that a claim for unjust enrichment is 
228 essentially equivalent to a claim of copyright infringement and is 
229 therefore preempted. See Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard-er, 
230 Inc., 820 F.2d 973,977 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on 
231 other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
232 
233 Montez v. Pilgrim Films & Television 08-56954 9th Cir. 2011 
234 See also First Nationwide Savings v. Perf1j 11 Cal.ApP-4th 1657 for 
235 cause of action of Unjust Enrichment. 
237 Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734 
P8.AINTlfFS OPPOSITII:IIN TO FRIVOLOUS SPECiAL MOHON TO STRIICE 
(OPPOSITION TO ;!\I\1TI-Sl.APP MOT!ON) 
239 But investors who allegedly paid tlteir share in product 
240 demanded Ii percentage ownership of Huffington Post 
241 The trial court in Platt v. Fox Searchlight is analogous to this case. There, 
242 the laborers provided the services and the Court ordered the movie 
243 company to pay in wages and not just in bHng, swag, attendance at Wrap 
244 Parties and prestige2 • In Tasini, the plaintiff did not seek his wages or their 
245 equitable equivalant but under equity, he demand a piece of the company. 
246 Tasini complaint para. 99 " ... at least $105 million in the Merger 
247 Consideration recognized by [defendants) is due to the value created 
248 by the content provided by Plaintiff and the Classes and the value 
249 created by Plaintiff and the classes ... " 
250 prayer at c. damages equal to the benefit bestowed on the 
251 Defendants ... not less than $105,000,000" 
252 htm:lltinyurl.comLmagwfvm 
253 Tasini pled that he labored for 1050 hours for Huffington Post and 
254 demanded $105 million, thus he was either demanding $100,000 an article 
2 Yelp stands alone in American Industry in issuing Yelp panties to its 
workforce (see below). 
PICA-INT!!'!'S @PPOSIT!ON 'j'@ FRiVOLOU$ $PECIAL (MOTION .0 $TRIKE 
(~PPOSI'l'ION' TO AN'fI-SLAPP MOTION) 
255 or he was demanding his share ofthe enterprise as a founding member. He 
256 must have been demanding his piece of the company as quantum merit 
257 requires a reasonable demand and no writer gets paid $105,000,000 for 
258 1050 hours oflabor. If Tasini had merely sued for 1050 hours work at 
259 minimum wage, he would have won the case as did Glatt v. Fox 
260 Searchlight. But he asked for about lI3 ofthe entire company as a part 
261 owner! Therefore, Tasini 2012 is distinguished and Glattt v. Fox 
262 Searchlight 2013 should be this Court's guide. 
263 Plaintiffs are all writers for Yelp 
264 And unlike Wal-Mart v Drnres 
265 Do not have separate supervisors 
266 At separate stores who have discriminated 
267 In separate ways 
268 Defendant is confused again. WalMart does not apply. 
269 Since the Supreme Court's decision was rendered, the majority of 
courts that have addressed Dukes' application to 216(b} collective 
271 actions have held that Dukes does not apply to 216(b) collection 
actions. In Creely v. HeR ManorCare, the court considered the 
PI.AINTIFt'S @PPOSITION YO g::i!llIVOI.(}U~ SPI!:O:!Al MOT!ON 'f0 STRIKE 
(@PPOS!TION ,01 J),NlTI-!U,APP MCl1l'ION) 
273 impact of Dukes on the FLSA action pending before it and concluded 
274 that it did not apply. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77170, '~3, 6 (N.D. Oh. 
275 .July 1, 2011), In so doing, the court reasoned that the Dukes decision 
276 turned on Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonalii:y" requirement, however, 
277 under Sixth Circuit law, Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement 
is distinct from the FLSA's "similarly situated" requirement as the 
279 Sixth Circuit has "expressly declin[ed) to apply Rule 23's standard to 
280 FLSA claims." Id. at *4 citing O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 
281 F.3d at 584. In the Sixth Circuit, 
282 FLSA collective action plaintiffs have been deemed similarly situated where 
283 "their claims were unified by common theories of defendants' statutory 
284 violations," even though "proof of a violation as to one particular plaintiff 
285 [did] not [necessarily] prove that the defendant violated any other 
286 plaintiff's rights." Id. citing O'Brien at 585. Furthermore, the Creely court 
287 determined that Dukes' gender-based Title VlI claims were fundamentally 
288 distinct" from the FLSA claims before it since the FLSA claims before it 
289 "[did] not require an examination ofthe subjective intent behind millions 
290 of individual employment decisions," rather, "the em,x of [FLSA] case [was] 
291 whether the company-wide policies, as implemented, violated [p]laintiff.s' 
292 statutory rights," The court in Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al. 
PLAINTiffS OPPOSITION TO fRiVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRII{i:! 
{OpI"OSmON 'FO AI'I!T9-n.Ap~ MOTiet<l) 
• 
• 
293 also refused to extend Dukes' Rule 23 analysis to FLSA collective action 
294 certification determinations, rejecting the defendant's argument that Rule 
295 23'S commonality standard and the "similarly situated" standard of 216(b) 
296 are "entirely consistent." 20il U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94648, * 7-8, n. 25 (E.D. 
297 Ca1. Aug. 24, 2011). 
298 Rather, after citing a string of cases holding that Rule 23 class action 
299 standards are distinct from 2160)) collectiv~ action standards, the court f 
300 declined defendant's invitation to apply Dukes to the FLSA collective action 
301 certification analysis as doing so would be "inconsistent with the Ninth 
302 Circuit's apparent view thatj:h.e Rule 23 standards should not be 
303 used." Id at ~'4-5. 
304 CERTIFICATION - 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS v. RULE 23 CLASS 
305 ACTIONS & ENTERPRISE COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA Wage & Hour 
306 Boot Camp ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 11.2-5.11 
307 
308 Yelp's Control and Right to Control Plaintiff writers 
309 YELP'S Ai TiMES CULT UKE CQJNl'F~OI!. OF PLJUNnFFS THROUGH 
312 
PLAINTiffS OPI"OSIYION TO IFRiVOLOUS SPECIAl. MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION 10 ANil-SlAPP MOYiON) 
313 
314 
PII.AIIII'l'IFI'S O"'P@SiTlIOIII 'f0 rf"mvowus 3PI'<€:IA!. MOTIIi)N .0 STIIUKE 
{(Jipposmow TtJ ANii-$lAIilIED M011@N) 
,. 
, 
315 
316 "undies" is in the URL 
317 
PlAiNTiFFS I\')I"Ii>OSiY!~1\l 1'@ 1F1R1'\!@wIlJS lil'lEitiAL MOTiON '1'0 STRIKE 
(@PPOSiTl@!\3 '1"0 I~U\lll'l-:!l.l,~Jil'!19 MOTION) 
o 
N 
Q) 
~ 
Po. 
318 "·*Please note that Yelp! in the urlline calls them "undies" but in the 
319 picture calls them "hot shorts" 
320 
321 
Kl'LAINTIFFS@IPPOSITiON TO ~R!VOLOUS $PEItIAI. MOTION TO STRIKE 
(@I?I1'@SeTION Ttl' AMn-~lJU;"1f.l MOTION) 
322 
323 Attached exhibits (slap pictures in Opposing an anti SLAPP motion 
:324 and pillow fight with Yelp executive, caption "make me Yelp"; 
325 Yelp!'s logo is proudly called a "YelJ}.lgasm". Demanding more 
326 labor; Yelp! instructs its vvriters, "Sounds like you need to get to 
327 writing some reviews there cowboy.." 
PLAINTIffS OpPIOSITION TO !FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION ,0 ANTI-SLAPIl» MOYION) 
328 
329 Social pressure on the free writers to adhere to the social pressure 
330 from Yelp! and its gatherings with free liquor 6G ... for aur first big 
331 holiday party. Oh my gosh. you weren't there? It was like 
333 
- , - is~ w, '0' :;:,r,d~~r:;,~~~:~~C COUsIn thinks tllat D, 
p.'ayer You're writing aoolu . " .. ' 
lotally. These sUckers Were handed 
out at our HOi Summer Mghts parrj 
PI.AINTIFFS OIl"P@SITION ,@ fRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION 11'0 STRIKE 
(@i"Ii'OS'T!@N TO ANYI-SIl.A.PP MOTION) 
334 "That's totally going in my review" Criminal Intimidation 
335 message sent from Yelp!, through its non-wage paid labor to the 
336 merchant to either give free food, pay cash to the reviewer, buy 
337 protection/advertising or face a scathing business destroying review. 
338 Yelp! encourages its free laborers to criminally threaten merchants 
339 and gives this Court documentalY evidence of its extortion tactics. 
340 
341 ItAUFCbRNIA'S PJNiT~ SlAPP $TA1iYTIE 
343 The Chief and another justice on the Ninth Circuit have indicated that 
344 court should revisit its prior decisions on whether the California anti-
345 SLAPP act applies in federal court. The majority of 9th Circuit justices, 
346 discussing rigorous requirements of class actions but not the permissive 
347 requirements of collective actions specifically found in and distinguished in 
348 the Fail' Labor Standards Act and denied an en bane hearing. 
349 The guiding statements came earlier in Makaef[v. Trump, Univ. (11-55016 
350 9th Cir 20131 hIm: IItinyurl.com/khbztba In that lawsuit, Makaeff 
351 brought a class action (not a ~olkctive actior.) against Trump University, 
352 alleging that it engaged in deceptive business practices. 
PLAINTiffS OPPOSIT!ON TO FRIVOLOUS !jPECIAI. MOTION TO STRIKE 
(@PPOSITION 1'0 ANI'f!-$i,APP M(,;TION) 
• 
353 According to Chief Judge Kozinski: 
354 The anti-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a 
355 procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights. The language of the 
356 statute is procedural: Its mainspring is a "special motion to strike"; it 
357 contains provisions limiting discovery; it provides for sanctions for parties 
358 who bring a non-meritorious suit or motion; the court's ruling on the 
359 potential success of plaintiffs claim is not "admissible in evidence at any 
360 later stage of the case"; and an order granting or denying t.lte special motion 
361 is immediately appealable. 
362 Because state rules of procedure have no effect in federal court, according 
363 to Chief Judge Kozinski, "this is the beginning and the end of the analysis, 
364 "[t]he. CallfOl:nia anti-SIAPP statute cHi§ an ugly gash through 
365 this o:l:'derly process" Judge Paez wrote "I agree that California anti-
366 SLAPP statute is 'quintessentially procedural' and its application in federal 
367 court has created a hybrid ]]l.ess that now resembles neither the Federal 
368 Rules nor the original state statute" 
370 
371 
372 Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs 01.10.2014 
PLAINTIFFS CPrP'OSITION TO ~RIVOI.OUS $Pi:CIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION .0 ANTI-$LAPP MOTION) 
.. 
From: Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer 
To aschur@yelp.commg@casp.net 
1.t.14 at 9:53 AM 
To Mark Goldowitz, 
Paul Clifford, 
Shanti Michaels 
Evan l'vIascagni 
Aaron Shur, 
This letter is a demand that you withdtaw your frivolous Anti Slapp motion to su1ke a common 
count. 
Common count, also kno\vn as quantum meruit, is based in contract. 
• "To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit 
theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pru:suant to either an 
express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services 
tendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant." (Ochs Y. Paci£iCare of 
California (2004) 115 Cal.J.ppAth 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734]. internal citlltion omitted.) 
• "'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever the plaintiff 
claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in a sum certain, or for the 
reasonable value of services, goods, etc., fumished. It makes no difference in such a case 
that the proof shows the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied 
in fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be based upon 
money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void contract, or a performance by one 
party of an express contract." (Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 
Cal.AppAth 950, 958 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.) 
You are well aware of the case Barnes v. Yahoo where the 9th Circuit Court has at least three times 
stated that contract based causes of action are not reachable by anti slapp motions. 
Therefore, I shall point out to the Court your fri"olous motion, which intentionally ignores Barnes 
v. Yahoo and your "special motion to strike" which you have used to bypass the well established rule 
that a demurrer must not include addition evidence outside of the complaint. You have, for 
example, put in a so called Rules for Elites that you drafted well after my clients had performed their 
as yet unpaid labors for you. 
I send you this leeter to meet and confer with you to urge you to withdraw your frivolous motion to 
strike. 
Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer 
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peter Rukin (SBN 178336) 
RUKIN HYLAND DORIA & Tl1\'DALL LLP 
100 Pine Street, Suite 2150 
San Francisco, CA 9411 J 
Telephone: (415) 421-1800 
Facsimile: (415) 421-1700 
E-mail: peten·ukin@xhdtlaw.com 
Rosa Vigil-Gallenberg (SBN 251872) 
GALLENBERG PC 
9701 Wilshire Blvd. Suite )000 
Beverly Hills, CA 90071 
Telephone: (310) 295-1654 
Facsimile: (310) 733-5654 
Email: rosa@gallenberglaw.com 
!ml McLoughlin (pro hac vice application to be filed) 
Tom UnliY (pro hac vice application to be t1led) 
SHAPIRO HABER &. URMY LLP 
53 State Street 13th Floor 
Boston, !vIA ()2109 
Telephone: (617) 439-3939 
Facsimile: (617) 439-0134 
E-mail: tbeyman@slmlaw.coUl 
Att011l0YS for Representative Plaintiffs 
lJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
JUSTIN LARKIN, ANTHONY TIJERINO, and 
AHMAD DEANES, OIl behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plai.'ltiffs, 
v. 
YELP! INC., 
Defendant. 
I PLAINTIFFS' NOnCE OF MOTION ISO PRELIMINARY APPROVAL 
Case No. 3:11-cv-OI503-EMC 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION 
AND M.EMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT 
Date: June 1. 2012 
Time: 1 :30 p.m. 
Comtroom: 5 _17th Floor 
Judge: HOll. Edward M. Chen 
Case No. 3:1i-cv-Ol$03-EMC' 
\' 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Case3:11-ev-01503-EMC Oocument32 Filed04/27f12 Page7 of 27 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Justin Larkin, Anthony Tijerino, and Ahmad Deanes (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") 
seek prelimiuaty approval ofthi, proposed class and collective action settiementPlaiutiffs entered 
on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class of Account Executives employed by Yelpl Inc. 
("Defendant or "Yelp"), which will provide for a maximum settlement payment of$I,250,000 in 
6 retmll for a release and dismissal with prejudice of the claims asserted against Yelp in this actioll. 
7 The net setilement fund will be disuibuted to Patlicipating Class Members based OIl the nnmber of 
8 work weeks Class Memberf, w,)rked dmtllg the felevant class period. 
9 Plaintiffs Md Class Members worked as ACcolm! Executives for Yelp. Daring the relevant 
10 class period, Yelp cla.ssified Account Execlltives as exempt £i'om the overtime requirement, of 
II federal atld state law and paid them at a straight-time rate of pay rather thatl an ovettime rate of pay 
12 for the overtime hours that they worked. Plainl1ffs challenged til,s pay practice on the gronnds that 
13 Yelp's classification of its Account Executives as exempt was unlawful beoause tilese employees 
14 did not fall into the commission/inside sales exemption, the administrative exemption, or any other 
15 knowll exemption. 
16 The proposed Setllement is fair and reasonable in light oftlle risks Plaintiffs and Class 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
n 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Members faced ill cOIDlectioll with the class certification, liability, and damages phases of this case 
atld the value oftl1e claims should Plaintiffs prevail. Plaintiffs contend that Yelp cannot seriously 
dispUte Ihe alleg()d misclassification of Account Exp.cutives, which lies at the heart of this case, as 
there is no colorable exemption del'ense. However, Plaintiffs face several potentia! proce-tlmal 
hurdles. Specifically, Yelp contends that overtime claim releases signed by some pllt~Jive class 
members in March 2011, a class action prohibition policy promulgated by Yelp in February 2011 
signed by a m?Jority of Class Members, and severance agreement releases signed by former 
employees (including the two California-based named Plaintiffs) will bar the participation of the 
vast majority of potential class members. A detenuination that the releases and/or the class action 
waiver are valid would significantly Harrow the scope of the case and/or present a potential barrier 
to recovelY for many Class Members. 
1 I PlAINTIFFS' ?.I.tPA ISO P::tRtll..1INARY A?PROVAL Case No, 3:il-<:\·-OlS03·EMC 
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To avoid that risk, Plaintiffs' counsel have negotiated a Settlement that creates a maxinnnn 
settlement amount of$I,250,OOO. Plaintiffs' counsel believe that this Settlement~·negotiated 
extensively and Rt ann's length with the assislanc{l of an experienced mediator-is a fair and 
4 reasonable resolution of the claims against Yelp in light of the risks Plaintiffs face if this matter 
5 proceeds to nia!. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfhIly request thai this Court: (I) grant preliminary 
6 approval of the proposed settlement; (2) conditionally certify for settlement pUlposes a National 
7 Settiemellt Class; (3) conditionally certify a Califomia Class for seltlement ptnposes; (4) approve 
g the [o11n, content, a..'ld metllOd of distributioll of the Notices and Proof of Claim f011us: (5) appoint 
9 Simpluris, Inc. ("Simpluris"), as the Claims Administrator pursuant to the Settlement Agreement; 
10 (6) appoint Rukin Hyland Doria & Tindall LLP, Gailenbcrg PC, and Shapiro Haber & Drmy LLP 
II as seltlement Class COlUlsel; and (7) schedule a healing regarding fInal approval oftha proposed 
12 settlement ruld Class COlmsel's requ"st for attorney's fees, costs, and incentive award payments. 
13 n. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
14 A. Factual Background and the Patties' ContelltiollS 
15 Yelp is a San Francisco-based company which operates a social networking and nscr 
16 review website. Yelp generates revenue tllfOUgh tlle sale of advertising and uses inside sales 
17 persollnel, called "Account Executives," to secure its advertising business. Account Executives 
18 work under different titles, depending on their experience and seniority: accoml! executive trainee, 
19 junior account .executive, aCC('fmt ?xecH/ive, or senior acc.()\mt execntive. RegardleS5 of title, all 
20 Account Executives have the same core responsibility to seli Yelp's adveltising products. 
21 From the beginning of its operations until approximately March 201 I, Yelp classified its 
22 Ac.count Executives as exempt ii-om federal and state overtime laws. Yelp paid aU Account 
23 Execntives under a similar compensation plan during the liability period. Although some details 
24 varied. all ACCoUllt Executives received a base salary and Iud the ability to earn additional 
25 compensation or (:0 move to a higher lev,,1 of compensation based on pe&mU3Ilce. 
26 Each of the Plaintiffs 1I'0rke,\ for Yelp as an ACCotUlt Executive. Docket Nllluber ("Dkt. 
27 No.") 4, at ~ 9-! 1. Plaintiff Lal'kin worked in Yelp'S San Francisco office fiol1l September 2008 to 
28 
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March 2009 and PJaintiffTije1"ino worked in the San Francisco office fi'om February 2010 through 
November 2010. [d. at ~ 9-10. PlaintiffDeanes worked out of Yelp's Scottsdale, Arizona office 
:from October 2010 to January 2011. ld. aT ~ 11. 
4 Plaintiffs (~olltelld that Yelp misclassitled its Account Executives as exempt fi'om overtime, 
5 alid that, on the basis of litis exempt classificatio1l, Yelp did not pay Account ExeClltives the 
6 overtim() wages required Ullder the FLSA or Califomia law. 
7 Yelp contends that Plaintiffs' claims have no merit. Yelp asselis that the majority of class 
8 members, including two of tile nanled Plaintiffs, have signed releases that prevent them from 
9 bringing the claims asserted in this lawsuit. Yelp also claims that many class members have agreed 
II) to pursue any claims that they may have individually rather than on a class or collective action 
I I basis, effectively precluding them It-om pruticipating in this actioll. 
12 B, Procedllral History 
13 On March 29, 2011, Plaintiff Jnstin Larkin filed this action ill the United States District 
14 COllIt for tile Northern District of Califomia, asserting claims under the FLSA for unpaid oveltime 
15 and (mder the Califonlia Labor Code for unpaid overtime, waiting time penalties, wage statement 
16 danJages, and restitnlion. Dkt. No. I. 
17 On April 18, 20 II, Plaintiff Justin Larkin provided notice to the Califomia Labor and 
18 
19 
20 
Workforce Development Agency and Yelp in accordance with the procedures set fOlth in the 
Californja Labor Code's Private Attomeys General Act, Labor Code § 2698 at. seq. (PAGA) of the 
PAGA claim in tius caso. The PAGA notice inclnded a file-endorsed copy oftlle c.omplaint. 
21 Oll April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an 8mende,1 complaint adding two additional plaintiffS, 
22 Allthony Tijerina and Ahmad Deanes. Diet. No.4. 
23 On May II, 2011, tlle parties executed an agreement tolling the FLSA statute of limitation 
24 for all potential collective action members effective May II, 2011. Declaration of Peter Rukill [n 
25 SUppolt ofPlainiifts' Moticn for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement 
26 ("Rukin Ded. ") ~ 7. On May 20, 2012, the parties executed a stipulation reqnesting a stay of the 
27 proceedings pending mediation and pennitting the filing of a second amended complaint adding a 
28 
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